Hofstra Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 1

Article 4

1973

Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A
Peek Forward
Irving Younger

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Younger, Irving (1973) "Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol1/iss1/4

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Younger: Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward

CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY:
A LOOK BACKWARD, A PEEK FORWARD
Irving Younger*

H

is an out-of-court declaration offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.' It is inadmissible because it is uncrossexamined and hence too unreliable for the jury to consider.2 Where
some substitute for cross-examination provides an alternative assurance of reliability, the rule against hearsay may give way and the
out-of-court declaration be admitted under one or another of the
exceptions to the rule.8 But hearsay it remains. The evidence is received despite the lack of cross-examination.
Concerning confrontation, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States says that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Since an out-of-court declarant cannot be confronted, is hearsay ever admissible against the defendant in a
criminal case?4 What, in short, is the relationship between confrontation and hearsay?5
Several times over the past seven years, the Supreme Court has
taken up this question.6 Its opinions demonstrate that the Court has
yet to find a satisfactory answer.
In Pointerv. Texas,7 the victim of a robbery had, at the prelimEARSAY

A.B. Harvard 1953, LL.B. New York University 1958; Judge of the Civil Court
of the City of New York; Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia University School of
Law and New York University School of Law.
1. 5 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 1361 (8d ed. 1940).
2. Id. § 1362.
3. Id. § 1420.
4. The historical material bearing on the meaning of the Confrontation Clause is
sketchy. It consists of one celebrated English trial, five minutes of debate on the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, and not much else. The trial was Sir Walter Raleigh's
for treason in 1603. Cobham had made statements which were received in evidence
accusing Raleigh of plotting to seize the throne. Because Cobham had later recanted,
Raleigh demanded that he be called as a witness, i.e., that Raleigh be "confronted"
by Cobham. The demand was denied and Raleigh convicted. See 1 STEPHEN, HssroRY
OF THE CRIMINAL L w OF ENGLAND 333-36 (1883). For the five minutes of debate, see I
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1785-90.
5. The question is discussed in Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75
YALE L.J. 1434 (1966).
6. The Court had spoken about confrontation in several earlier cases, e.g., Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897); Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), but only recently has it come to grips with the
issue.
7. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Court's opinion is by Justice Black, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Clark, Brennan, White, and Goldberg. Justice
Goldberg wrote an additional concurring opinion. Justices Harlan and Stewart sepa-
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inary hearing, identified Pointer as the robber. There was no crossexamination, no lawyer having been appointed for Pointer. At trial,
it appeared that the victim had left the state, whereupon the prosecutor put into evidence the transcript of the victim's preliminaryhearing testimony. Although the transcript was hearsay, its receipt
was arguably proper under Texas' former-testimony exception to
the hearsay rule.3 The Supreme Court reversed. It might have written an opinion extending Gideon v. Wainwright9 to the situation of
an indigent defendant at a preliminary hearing" or declaring the
admission of hearsay on the crucial issue of identification a deprivation of due process." It did neither. Instead, it held that the victim's
preliminary-hearing testimony could not be received because of the
Confrontation Clause. Obliged now to characterize confrontation,
the Court set about doing so in a way that had the immediate appeal
of obviousness but, we shall see, the ultimate disadvantage of untenability.
The Court held in Pointer that the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process
12
Clause of the Fourteenth, and that'
... the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of confrontation and
cross-examination was unquestionably denied petitioner in
this case. As has been pointed out, a major reason underlying
the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant
charged with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.

If the Sixth Amendment is violated by a denial of cross-examination,
it follows that receipt of any hearsay, precisely because hearsay is not
cross-examined, must offend the Confrontation Clause. Yet, as
Pointernotes,' 3
[t]his Court has recognized the admissibility against an accused of dying declarations ....
A dying declaration is hearsay, and the defendant cannot crossrately concurred in the result, each declining to join the Court's application of the
right of confrontation to the states.
8. TXAs CoDE CUr,. PRo. arts. 39.01, 39.12 (1965). Compare N.Y.C.P.L.R. Rule 4517
(McKinney 1962) and FERmtAL EVIDENCE RULrS, Rule 804(b)(1), 41 U.S.L.W. 4021 (U.S.
Nov. 20, 1972).
9. 372 U.S. 35 (1963).
10. The Court did so five years later, in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
11. Compare Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
12. 380 U.S. at 406-07.
13. Id. at 407.
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4
examine it.1
We therefore wonder why receipt of uncross-examined
dying-declaration hearsay is constitutionally permissible but not uncross-examined former-testimony hearsay. Pointer does not explain.
It merely says that there is a difference. 15

The case before us would be quite a different one had [the
victim's] statement been taken at a full-fledged hearing at
which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had
been given a complete and adequate opportunity to crossexamine . .. There are other analogous situations which
might not fall within the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confrontation of witnesses. The case before us, however, does not present any situation like those mentioned
above or others analogous to them.
In two subsequent cases, the Court again neglected to reconcile
confrontation and hearsay, resting content with the bare assertion
that lack of cross-examination makes out a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
In Douglas v. Alabama,16 the defendant was indicted for robbery
together with Loyd. Loyd had confessed, implicating Douglas. The
prosecutor severed Loyd's case from Douglas', and at Douglas' trial
called Loyd as a state's witness. When Loyd declined to testify on the
ground of self-incrimination, the prosecutor read his confession to
him, ostensibly to refresh his recollection. This amounted to putting
Loyd's confession in evidence, the Supreme Court held,' 7 and the
confession had not been cross-examined when made. Nor could Loyd
be cross-examined at trial, for when Douglas' counsel tried to question him, Loyd persisted in his refusal to answer. The Court reversed. Douglas' "inability to cross-examine Loyd as to the alleged
confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause."' 8
In Bruton v. United States,'9 a co-defendant's confession was admitted solely against the co-defendant. The trial judge instructed
14. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1430-52 (3d ed. 1940).
15. 380 U.S. at 407.
16. 380 U.S. 415 (1965). The Court's opinion is by Justice Brennan, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Clark, White, and Goldberg. Justices Harlan
and Stewart separately concurred in the result on the ground that Douglas had been
deprived of due process.

17. 380 U.S. at 419.
18. Id.
19. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Court's opinion is by Justice Brennan, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Fortas. Justice Stewart wrote an

additional concurrring opinion. Justice Black concurred in the result. Justices Harlan
and White dissented (but not on the confrontation point). Justice Marshall did not
participate.
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the jury to disregard the confession as to Bruton, who had not crossexamined the co-defendant. The Supreme Court quoted its opinions
in Pointerand in Douglas,20 and concluded that, had the jury failed
to follow the limiting instruction, Bruton would have been denied
the right to confront his co-defendant. Because it could not regard
the limiting instruction as effective, the Court reversed.
In Pointer,Douglas, and Bruton, the Court stalked the idea that
confrontation means cross-examination. Those cases involved situations in which confrontation was held to have been denied. Thus
they tell us that lack of cross-examination violates the Confrontation
Clause without telling us what satisfies it, for none of them involved
either (1) an uncross-examined out-of-court declaration by a declarant available for cross-examination at trial or (2) a cross-examined
out-of-court declaration by a declarant unavailable for cross-examination at trial. In Californiav. Green,21 the Court pounced.
There, one Porter testified against Green at a preliminary hearing and was cross-examined by Green's lawyer. At trial, the prosecutor called Porter as a state's witness. When his answers proved
disappointing, the prosecutor read into evidence the transcript of
Porter's preliminary-hearing testimony. This was authorized by section 1285 of the California Evidence Code:
Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent
with his testimony at the hearing... .
On appeal, the California Supreme Court vacated Green's conviction.
It held section 1285 unconstitutional on the ground that neither (1)'
the right to cross-examine Porter at trial nor (2) the opportunity to
cross-examine Porter at the preliminary hearing satisfied the Con22
frontation Clause. The Supreme Court reversed on both grounds.
As to (1), cross-examination at trial, the Court held that where
a witness testifies at trial and is subject to full cross-examination, the
Confrontation Clause permits receipt of the witness' out-of-court
23
declarations, even though not cross-examined when made:
20. 391 U.S. at 126-27.
21. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). The Court's opinion is by Justice White, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart. Chief Justice Burger wrote
art additional concurring opinion. Justice Harlan agreed that the Confrontation Clause
does not preclude the introduction of a cross-examined out-of-court declaration when
the declarant is available as a witness at trial, and otherwise concurred in the result
on different grounds. Justice Brennan dissented. Justices Marshall and Blackmun did

not participate.
22. 399 U.S. at 153.
23. Id. at 164.
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. . . the Confrontation Clause does not require excluding
from evidence the prior statements of a witness who concedes
making the statements, and who may be asked to defend or
otherwise explain the inconsistency between his prior and his
present Version of the events in question, thus opening himself
to full cross-examination at trial as to both stories.
As to (2), cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, the Court
held that where a witness is unavailable to testify at trial, the Confrontation Clause permits receipt of the witness' out-of-court declarations if they were cross-examined when made. A fortiori, the rule
is the same where, as in Green, the out-of-court declarant is available
for cross-examination at trial:2
If Porter had died or was [sic] otherwise unavailable, the Confrontation Clause would not have been violated by admitting
his testimony given at the preliminary hearing-the right of
cross-examination then afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement, as long as the declarant's inability to give his live testimony is in no way the fault of the State.... But nothing...
indicates that a different result must follow where the State
produces the declarant and swears him as a witness at the
trial.
The essential idea of Green is that confrontation is the guardian
of cross-examination. The hearsay rule has a different ward. It nurtures reliability. Cross-examination is one means of assuring reliability, but the hearsay rule contemplates alternative assurances. It
acknowledges the possibility of substitutes for cross-examination.
Where such a substitute for cross-examination is present, the out-ofcourt declaration, albeit uncross-examined, may be admitted under
an exception to the hearsay rule.25 Yet it is just this lack of crossexamination which, say Pointer, Douglas, and Bruton, violates the
Confrontation Clause. Then consistency required the Court in
Green to conclude that the Confrontation Clause does not codify
26
the hearsay rule. So it did:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the
24. Id. at 166.

25. See text at note 3 supra.
26. 399 U.S. at 155.
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overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is
nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common
law.
And it was correct. The reasons are textual, aesthetic, and pragmatic.
The textual reason: the hearsay rule carries with it a host of
exceptions about which the text of the Confrontation Clause says
nothing. Thus we should not read the latter to include the former.
The aesthetic reason: lawyers want the Constitution to be elegant.
Taking the lapidary phrases of the Sixth Amendment as a shorthand
expression of the law of hearsay is inelegant. The pragmatic reason:
the hearsay rule needs reforming. Then how foolish to insulate it
against the possibility of reform by raising it, with all its imperfections on its head, to the eminence of constitutional command.
Granted that the Confrontation Clause does not codify the hearsay rule. What of the formula embodied in Green, that confrontation
equals cross-examination? We said earlier that it is obvious but untenable,27 and here is why.
There are no less than twenty-eight exceptions to the hearsay
rule.2 8 For twenty-seven of them, because some alternative assurance
of reliability is present, the declarant need not have been crossexamined at the time he made the out-of-court declaration. 29 Under
Green, however, every one of these twenty-seven exceptions would
be invalid if the declarant is absent, for Green has it that the Confrontation Clause permits receipt of hearsay by an unavailable declarant only where the hearsay was subject to cross-examination when
uttered.30
The Court could not have intended this blanket declaration of
the unconstitutionality of nearly the entire body of hearsay law. It
is, rather, the unforeseen consequence of the Court's casual reading
of the Confrontation Clause as a guarantee of cross-examination.
What is more, that reading was unnecessary. Assuming the Court's
desire to dispose of the cases from Pointerto Green on confrontation
grounds, it might have read the Sixth Amendment, not as a guarantee
27. See text following note 11 supra.

28. According to the Federal Evidence Rules (1971 Revised Draft).
29. Id. Rules 803 and 804.
50. It should be remembered, however, that the Supreme Court has mentioned in
passing that a handful of exceptions to the hearsay rule are also exceptions to the
right of confrontation. E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (dying declarations
and former testimony); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (dying declarations
and documentary evidence); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (dying declarations and depositions).
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of cross-examination, but as a guarantee of the presence of witnesses.
Along the way, it had supplied itself with a precedent.
In Barber v. Page,31 Barber's lawyer was present at the preliminary hearing but did not cross-examine the witness. At trial, the
prosecutor stated that the witness was an inmate of a federal prison
and, without more, put in evidence the transcript of the witness'
82
preliminary-hearing testimony. The Supreme Court reversed:
[T]here has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has
given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the
same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by
that defendant. . . . This exception has been explained as
arising from necessity and has been justified on the ground
that the right of cross-examination initially afforded provides
substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement.
The Court held that, because the state had made no showing of
good faith effort to secure the witness' attendance, the witness was not
genuinely unavailable and, regardless of whether or not Barber's
lawyer had cross-examined him at the preliminary hearing,8 3 that
Barber's right of confrontation was violated by receipt at trial of the
witness' preliminary-hearing testimony.
Had the Court in Green turned Barber into a full-blown theory
of the Confrontation Clause, it might have avoided the unworkable
equation of confrontation and cross-examination. Only Justice Harlan saw the possibility. Concurring in Green,8 4 he argued that the
Confrontation Clause simply imposed upon the prosecutor the duty
to secure the presence in court of every available witness. That done,
out-of-court declarations would be admitted or excluded solely in
accordance with the jurisdiction's hearsay rule, subject to a dueprocess requirement that grossly unreliable hearsay not be received
in evidence.
That is not the end. In Dutton v. Evans,85 the Supreme Court
31. 390 U.S. 719 (1968). The Court's opinion is by Justice Marshall, joined by Chief

Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, and
Fortas. Justice Harlan's concurrence rests on his view that the state's failure to attempt
to obtain the witness' presence denied Barber due process.
32. 390 U.S. at 722.
33. Id. at 725.
34. 399 U.S. at 172.
35. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). The plurality opinion is by Justice Stewart, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun concurred on the additional ground of harmless error. Justice Harlan con-
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again examined a confrontation issue. Since no opinion commanded
a majority, the case has slight precedential value. There is, however,
a plurality opinion which deserves comment.
Dutton grew out of the murder of three Georgia policemen by
Evans and two accomplices, one of whom was Williams. Williams
had been convicted in a separate trial. At Evans' trial, the prosecutor
called one Shaw, a cell-mate of Williams, who described an occasion
when Williams had said, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-abitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now. '8 6 Evans' counsel
objected on hearsay and confrontation grounds. His objection was
overruled. Williams never testified.
On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that Williams' out-of-court declaration was admissible under Georgia's version of the conspiratorial-admission exception to the hearsay
rule.8 7 Evans thereupon sought federal habeas corpus on the ground
that, whether or not Williams' out-of-court declaration was admissible under Georgia evidence law, it was inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The District Court decided against him. The
Court of Appeals reversed and the case came to the Supreme Court,
where we might have expected the problem to be analyzed something
as follows:
The prosecutor's failure either to call Williams as a witness or to
explain why he did not falls afoul of Barber v. Page. Further, in
Pointer, Douglas, and Bruton the Supreme Court had held that
denial of cross-examination violates the Sixth Amendment. Then
stare decisis requires a holding that Evans' lack of opportunity to
cross-examine Williams deprived him of his right of confrontation.
This reasoning seems "strict" enough to please any taste, yet it
did not persuade the plurality. With respect to the prosecutor's failure to call Williams as a witness or to explain why he did not, their
opinion remarks only that Evans did not procure Williams' attendance by subpoena. 8 If the opinion had suggested that Barber v.
Page be overruled, we might disagree but would understand. Given
the opinion as written, we are hard put to recognize what it is the
plurality has in mind.
With respect to Evans' lack of opportunity to cross-examine Williams, the plurality opinion adds up to this: that it makes no differcurred in the result. Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan joined in a dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall.
36. 400 U.S. at 77.
37. See 4 WiGmo E, EvMENCE § 1079 (3d ed. 1940).
38. 400 U.S. at 88 n.19.
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ence. Not that Pointer,Douglas, and Bruton were wrongly decided,
but that three circumstances present here lead to the conclusion that,
despite the lack of cross-examination, Evans' right of confrontation
was not violated.
First. Although it does not find receipt of Williams' hearsay to
be harmless error, 9 the plurality opinion observes, as a reason for
the decision, that the hearsay was not "in any sense 'crucial' or
'devastating' .... 40 Let us see. Error was committed or error was
not committed. If error was not committed, that is an end of the
case. If error was committed, it was harmless or it was not harmless.
If it was harmless, that is an end of the case. If it was not harmless,
Evans should have his habeas corpus. To make sense at all, the
plurality opinion must be taken as treading a middle ground, that
there was error, not harmless, but of insufficient magnitude to warrant disturbing the conviction of so guilty a man. This is a dueprocess argument. The difficulty with it is that the plurality opinion
purports to decide the case under the Confrontation Clause, not the
Due Process Clause.
Second. The opinion states that"
...

the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a

practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining
process in criminal trials ....

Can the plurality mean by this that violations of constitutional right
signify nothing so long as the trial results in the conviction of a
guilty man? We had thought that the rule of law meant something
else.
Third. The plurality opinion makes much of the reliability of
Williams' hearsay4 2 and concludes that"3
39. Although Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined the plurality opinion, they wrote a separate concurring opinion urging that the error was indeed harmless. 400 U.S. at 90.
40. Id. at 87.
41. Id. at 89. Unelided, the sentence reads as follows: "The decisions of this Court
make it clear that the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical
concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement.' Californiav. Green, 399 U.S. at 161."
42. The opinion sets forth four considerations supporting the credibility of Willians' out-of-court declaration. (1) It contained no express assertion of Evans' guilt,
thereby alerting the jury not to give it "undue weight." (2) It was obvious that Williams knew at first hand whereof he spoke. (3) Williams' recollection could not have
been faulty. (4) The statement was spontaneous and contrary to Williams' penal interest. 400 U.S. at 88-89.
43. Id. at 89.
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* . .

the possibility that cross-examination of Williams could

conceivably have shown the jury that the statement, though
made, might have been unreliable was wholly unreal.
Where there are other assurances of reliability, the opinion says,
lack of cross-examination is excused and the Confrontation Clause
does not bar receipt of the hearsay. So reliability is what confrontation guarantees. We have seen that it is also what the hearsay rule
guarantees. 44 If the receipt of reliable hearsay does not offend the
Confrontation Clause, then the right of confrontation is nothing
more than the hearsay rule. Things that are equal to the same thing
are themselves equal.
The Dutton plurality's equation of confrontation and reliability
has four weaknesses. It is unwise.45 It is contrary to the Court's
reluctance, expressed in Green, to read the Confrontation Clause as
an exactment of the hearsay rule.46 It is contrary to the Dutton plurality's own idea of what it was doing: 47
It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same
roots. But this Court has never equated the two, and we decline to do so now.
And it compels judges to scrutinize every piece of hearsay offered
under any exception to the hearsay rule to determine whether it
is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under the Confrontation
Clause.48 This is a time-consuming and unpredictable process which
runs counter to the ideal of swift, certain, and efficient criminal
justice.
To sum up: the Supreme Court has thus far failed to work out
a coherent theory of the relationship between confrontation and
hearsay. This is bad judicial craftsmanship, for unilluminated by
such a theory the Court decides in the dark, heedless of consistency
with the past and implications for the future. 49 If that kind of willynilly decision-making were enough, we might as well do it by tossing
44. See text following note 24 supra.
45. See text following note 26 supra.
46. 399 U.S. at 155.

47. 400 U.S. at 86.
48. Examples have begun to appear in the reports. E.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408
U.S. 204 (1972); State v. Lunn, 82 N.M. 526, 484 P.2d 868 (1971).

49. Something of this can be sensed in Justice Stewart's rather peculiar remark in
Dutton, immediately following his statement that the plurality declines to equate confrontation and hearsay, that "we confine ourselves, instead, to deciding the case before us." 400 U.S. at 86.
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a coin. A coherent theory of the relationship between confrontation
and hearsay should afford the accused adequate protection against
the possibility of conviction by affidavit or gossip and simultaneously
preserve whatever logic and flexibility have been achieved over the
centuries of development of the hearsay rule. With due diffidence,
one suggests that Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Green 0 is
the place to begin. 51
50. 399 U.S. at 172. To close on a note of irony, we observe that Justice Harlan
vrote a concurring opinion in Dutton, 400 U.S. at 93, explaining that his concurring
opinion in Green was all wrong.
51. As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court decided Chambers v. Afissis.
sippi, 41 U.S.L.W. 4266 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1978), holding that on the particular facts there
presented, the defendant had been denied "a trial in accord with traditional and
fundamental standards of due process." Id. at 4271. Among other things, he had not
been permitted to cross-examine one McDonald, who had confessed to the murder of
which Chambers was accused, had been called as a defense witness, and had repudiated
his confession. This, said the Court, "interfered with Chambers' right to defend against
the State's charges," id. at 4270, because "the right of cross-examination is more than
a desireable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation ..
" Id. at 4269. It might be thought, then, that the Court is back where
it started. See text supra at 83.
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